A Right to Justice

 

Liberal Democrat Lawyers Association Policy Proposals on Civil Legal Aid


 

Members of the Working Group

 

Executive Summary

 

Introduction

 

Labour’s Failed Access to Justice Policy

Ø      Geographical Coverage

Ø      Rationing

Ø      Bureaucracy and Micro-management

Ø      Funding and Remuneration

Ø      Reduced scope of Legal Aid

Ø      Verdict on the Access to Justice Act Regime

 

The Liberal Democrat Approach

Ø            Department of Justice

Ø            Overall Resources

Ø            Ring Fencing

Ø            Rationing

Ø            Commissioning Services – SLAs

Ø            Bureaucracy

Ø            Remuneration

Ø            Advice Centres

Ø            Call Centres

Ø            Outreach Services

Ø            Partnerships

Ø            Scope of Legal Aid

Ø            CFAs

Ø            CLAF

 

 Conclusion - A Civil Justice System Fit for the 21st Century

 

Appendix – Costings


Members of the LDLA Working Group on Access to Justice

 

 

The members of the Working Group are:

 

The Hon Sue Baring                         Former Chair, British Institute

of Human Rights

 

Sue Bucknall,                                     Director, Solicitors Pro Bono Group

 

Jo Hayes,                                           Barrister

 

Jonathan Marks QC (Chair) Barrister

       

Richard Miller,                                   Director, Legal Aid Practitioners Group

 

Lord Phillips of Sudbury,                  Liberal Democrat Peer and Solicitor

 

James Sandbach (Rapporteur)       Social Policy Adviser (Legal Affairs)

                                                            Citizens Advice.

 

 

The Working Group is also indebted to the following for their invaluable assistance

 

Evlynne Gilvarry                     Director, Representation and Law Reform, The Law Society

 

Nicola Mackintosh                Partner, Mackintosh Duncan

 

Tom Mellhuish                       Policy Officer, Health and Safety Department TUC

 

Janet Paraskeva                   Chief Executive, The Law Society

 

Nicola Rudkin                        Partner, Fisher Meredith

 

Roger Smith                          Director, Justice


Executive Summary

 

Access to the legal system is a necessary aspect of the rule of law and an important feature of a liberal and democratic society. People with limited resources should not be deterred from seeking legal advice, or representation because they are out-priced from the market for legal services.  Policy on the public funding of legal services must start from a requirement for universality in the provision of legal aid. The demands on legal services are likely to continue to grow as we live in a world of increasing legal complexity. However, legal aid provision has reduced and legal advice centres supported by pro-bono (voluntary lawyer) services cannot cope with increasing demand.       

 

New Labour established the Community Legal Service (CLS) to replace the legal aid scheme, a public subsidy system for legal services, introduced by the Attlee Government. The Community Legal Service introduced by the Access to Justice Act 1999 established a bureaucratic system of contracting for solicitors and not-for-profit advice organisations, which rations the services that can be delivered. At the same time the Government also reduced the scope of legal aid.

 

There are inadequate resources overall for civil legal aid.  Although spending on legal aid has risen from £1.5 billion in 1997 to £2 billion this year, this does not reflect responsiveness to demand and is largely accounted for by the growth of criminal legal aid. In 2001 the civil legal aid budget took up 43% of an overall legal aid budget of £1.716 billion, being £476 million for certificated work and £259 million for help and advice.  Legal aid currently provides 13% of solicitors’ overall income.  Within the civil budget, the expenditure on legal aid for asylum seekers has increased from £81.3m in 2000-2001 to £129.7m in 2001-2002 and £174.2m in 2002-2003, thus squeezing the remainder of the civil legal aid budget. Currently, legal aid costs the equivalent of just 5% of the expenditure of the NHS.  It is incumbent upon Liberal Democrats to tackle myths and to meet challenge of properly funding legal aid, which we regard as a vital public service.

 

Liberal Democrats put justice first, believing that there should be no discretionary rationing of legal assistance, that remuneration for those undertaking publicly funded work should be set at a level that ensures quality of service, that there should be an easy-to-use and widely accessible publicly funded legal advice scheme and a new Department of Justice. Liberal Democrats would regard the resourcing and organisation of publicly funded legal services as a key responsibility of the new Department.    

 

The backbone of any publicly funded legal service should continue to be solicitors’ firms playing to their local market strengths and legal expertise, but solicitors’ work should be supported by a diverse network of advice agencies and community organisations. Liberal Democrats would move from the current system of narrowly focused, case-rationed and heavily regulated contracts to a system of service level agreements. In order to retain and build skills in legal aid advice work the issue of remuneration needs to be addressed. Remuneration rates should be sufficiently attractive both to recruit and to retain competent legal professionals and should be set by an independent board

 

Challenging questions remain about the scope of legal aid funding. Under current eligibility rules, legal aid is only available for the very poorest and is not available for tribunal cases or mediation. Alternative mechanisms for funding cases such as conditional fee agreements have not been altogether successful, but we would not want to put such funding arrangements in jeopardy when access to justice is genuinely widened. This paper contains a number of proposals on these issues.

 

Our proposals can be briefly summarised as follows.

 

  • To ring-fence the civil legal aid budget, so that increases in priority spending on criminal and asylum cases do not reduce the remaining civil budget

 

  • To substitute for the current regime of rationing the number of clients a solicitor or advice agency may advise a system of carefully adjusted criteria governing the scope of  and eligibility for legal aid, to be applied fairly and universally

 

  • To substitute for  the present heavily regulated contracts  a flexible system of service level agreements, tailored to the skills and capacity of service providers;

 

  • To involve lawyers with recent practical experience of publicly funded work in allocating and monitoring agreements in a proportionate and cost-effective way;

 

  • To establish an independent review board to set legal aid rates at a level appropriate to recruit and retain competent legal professionals

 

  • To facilitate the establishment of a network of call centres and community justice centres country-wide to offer legal advice and information as cost-effectively as possible and to encourage the development of outreach services in remoter areas.

 

  • To extend legal aid to tribunal cases and for alternative dispute resolution

 

  • To introduce a scheme of regulation for organisations providing services under conditional fee agreements.

 


 

Introduction – The Civil Justice Crisis

 

  1. Liberal Democrats have always put the protection of individuals’ rights at the heart of their approach to policymaking and government. In order to fulfil people’s legitimate expectations to be able to enjoy their statutory rights, citizens must have access to legal advice services when and where they need them. Arguably, since the Human Rights Act came into effect the Government has a duty to ensure fair access for all to the legal system. However, for many in today’s society gaining access to the civil justice system is simply impossible - high legal costs and inadequate provision of publicly funded legal services present real barriers to seeking help for those with moderate and low incomes. Furthermore, the Courts themselves do not have sufficient resources to manage cases effectively - in short the civil justice system is in crisis.

 

  1. There are increasing concerns, especially in the press, about the growth of a ‘compensation culture’ and it is therefore suggested that access to the courts and public funding should be restricted. Liberal Democrats must treat such claims with scepticism. Whilst it is always desirable that disputes should be settled appropriately and without undue acrimony or expense, it is an essential part of a liberal and democratic society that citizens should have recourse to legally enforceable rights and remedies - whether against the state, service providers or private individuals. Access to the legal system is a necessary aspect of the rule of law.

 

  1. Public policy on civil legal aid should therefore always be developed in this context. People with limited resources should not be deterred from seeking legal advice and legal help or representation because they are out-priced by the private market for legal services. Research shows that around forty per cent of the population experience ‘’justiciable problems’’ during their lives; that figure increases significantly amongst socially excluded groups.[1] Around forty per cent of those who experience these problems do not gain access to appropriate help. It must be better understood that civil justice problems are not abstract legal problems; they concern people’s accommodation, employment, families, consumption, health and income, as well as the quality of services that they can expect as consumers.  These are the issues of everyday life.

 

  1. The starting point for any fair policy on the public funding for legal services is a requirement for universality in the provision of legal aid. Strategically, legal aid should be seen as part of the government’s total spending on solving social problems and tackling social exclusion.  If funded and managed appropriately, legal aid can be a powerful lever to achieving a solution to other problems, for example of housing disrepair and poor landlord practice, and has the potential substantially to reduce spending in many areas of state provision. Indeed it is estimated that unresolved justiciable problems cost the economy some £12 billion in terms of lost productivity and additional social and welfare state costs.

 

  1. A properly functioning civil justice system therefore adds much to prosperity and social progress.  Eight years ago, Lord Woolf outlined his vision for the civil courts, which included the simplification and streamlining of civil procedure and the introduction of a comprehensive IT system. Government failure to back such reforms has undermined the courts. The Courts have inadequate facilities and ADR remains under-resourced, despite the high importance attached to ADR and pre-action procedures in the new Civil Procedure Rules.  Although the recent reviews of the Civil[2] and Criminal[3] Courts have resulted in improved procedures and administrative arrangements, the Government has continued to ignore the problem of funding the Courts system. The Treasury requires that the Courts should fund themselves by recovering costs from users (‘’full costs recovery’’) and rationalising the Courts estate. As a result Court fees have increased and many local courts have closed, making the courts system less accessible for the most socially excluded.  However, for much of society, it is still the lack of availability of legal services that denies citizens access to justice.

 

  1. The demands on legal services are likely to continue to grow as we live in a world of increasing legal complexity. A society cannot enact over 12,000 pages of new law every year without direct consequences for legal services.  The morass of welfare law, for example, which grows ever more technical, forces many of its beneficiaries to seek advice.  It thus makes heavy demands on the legal system, to which voluntary organisations such as Citizens Advice have responded well.  But, as they are the first to accept, where cases are particularly complex or contentious, recourse to solicitors is often necessary.  However, with the number of legal aid providers decreasing, the difficulties for consumers in accessing appropriate and affordable legal services mean that the failure of the system is now becoming ever more apparent.

 

  1. The pretence that legal advice centres (employing less than 5% of the legal workforce) supported by pro-bono (voluntary lawyer) services can cope with existing levels of demand is a delusion, which imperils adequate funding. One of the most disreputable aspects of the present crisis in legal services is the readiness of some ministers and law officers to jump on the “let’s kill all the lawyers” bandwagon, regularly taken up by some tabloids. Lawyers are often seen as pariahs rather than fair and fearless advocates. In the course of the Access to Justice Bill, for example, the Lord Chancellor Lord Irvine highlighted “fat cat” Q.C’s in the criminal legal aid system, a tiny number, to obscure the reality of under-funding, just as some ministers are now failing to make clear that lawyer abuses of legal aid in the immigration and asylum field are wholly untypical of legal aid generally.

 

  1. Our proposals aim to redress the balance. They are anchored in gaining the benefits as well as meeting the costs of an effective, fair and accessible civil justice and legal aid system. The proposals are both consistent with and essential to the party’s longstanding commitment to guaranteeing civil rights. The key is access to information and advice, and, where necessary, the financial and social support to help people to take effective action to enforce their rights and fulfil their obligations of citizenship.

 

Labour’s Failed Access to Justice Policy

 

  1. New Labour established the Community Legal Service (CLS) to replace the legal aid scheme, a public subsidy system for legal services, introduced by the Attlee Government in 1948. Despite the government’s good intention, to enhance access to justice for the most socially excluded, the CLS has not proved a success. Even the Government’s own review questions whether the CLS delivers a "seamless" service for disadvantaged people or ensures easy referral to the right agencies to deal with their problems.  All the research on how the new system is working shows that lawyers are withdrawing from publicly funded work in large numbers as a result of bureaucracy and under-funding.[4] Since the introduction of the CLS the number of solicitors’ offices undertaking publicly funded work has reduced from over 10,000 to around 4,500.

 

  1. When the Attlee Government introduced the legal aid scheme after the war, it was, apart from New Zealand, the only system of its kind.  Today it is in terminal decline, the great ideals of its introduction undermined by cuts and centralised managerialism.  Comparing total spending with the volume of bills paid suggests that, whilst more is spent than ever before, in real terms fewer people are being helped now than in 1996/97 for the same money.[5]  Whilst all public expenditure must be fully justified, Liberal Democrats believe two things.  The first is that real equality before the law is an indispensable ideal of any civilized society.  The second is that, given fair rewards within a professional context, there are many lawyers ready to help maintain that ideal.

 

  1. The Community Legal Service – as introduced by the Access to Justice Act 1999 - established a system of contracting for solicitors and not-for-profit advice organisations under the management of the Legal Services Commission, working to a common system of quality marks and supported through a network of local partnerships. This was a major departure from the old legal aid scheme under which solicitors’ firms received a direct subsidy for qualifying cases. Greater quality control has had some effect in driving out poor quality suppliers from the legal aid market. However, there have been a number of serious problems with the new approach. Chief amongst these are: -

·        Geographical coverage;

·        Rationing;

·        Bureaucracy and micro-management;

·        Inadequate resources overall;

·        Disincentive levels of remuneration;

·        Reduced scope of legal aid;

·        Uneven planning and the mixed success of CLS partnerships.

Geographical coverage

 

  1. Because of the reduction in the number of outlets, the geographical spread of legal aid firms has been substantially and perhaps irrevocably compromised.  The effect of this has been particularly acute because of the defined specialisms for each contract. Outside major towns and cities there are very few contracted welfare, employment, housing or immigration practitioners, and more specialist areas of public law practice are less accessible still. A detailed analysis of the problem of ‘Advice Deserts’ can be found in a recent report from Citizens Advice[6] and in evidence taken by a major inquiry into the adequacy of legal aid provision by the Select Committee on Constitutional Affairs. For example; -

·        In Buckinghamshire and Oxfordshire there is only one law firm in each county with an LSC housing contract, compared with nearly 30 firms with family contracts.

·        In Bristol five years ago there were at least six firms who regularly practised in housing law and other legal aid work.  Each of these firms contributed to a duty possession proceedings rota at the Bristol County Court.  Five of these firms have now withdrawn from publicly funded work since the introduction of the Community Legal Service.

·        In Bradford there is only one firm of solicitors providing publicly funded housing advice.

·        There is a lack of specialist housing advice services in Northumberland and Redcar and Cleveland, with no solicitor contracts north of Newcastle and no contracted supply at all for mental health and community care advice in the North East.

 

Rationing

 

  1. The contracting regime means that the amount and type of work that providers can take on is rationed and controlled by the Legal Services Commission. Contracted solicitors are given case quotas (“matter starts”) in particular areas of law, whilst advice agencies have to achieve target hours. As a result, legal aid lawyers regularly have to turn away clients. Under the present system, the resources given to legal aid are rationed in three ways, all of them completely arbitrary: -

 

(i)                 First, as evidence from Citizens Advice shows and as the LSC’s figures for the numbers of contracts held indicate, there are significant parts of the country where legal aid services are not available either at all or in particular fields of law.  Would-be clients therefore face a postcode lottery as to whether services are available close enough to be accessible.

 

(ii)               Secondly, because of the capped budget, the Community Legal Service is vulnerable to what the DCA’s Independent Review of the CLS describes as “policy exocets”.  These strike when the policies of other Government departments, most notably the Home Office, cause an increase in the demand for legal aid for criminal and other cases, where funding is mandatory, consequently reducing the money available for civil legal aid in a way that is entirely arbitrary.

 

(iii)             Thirdly the system of “new matter starts” means that a solicitor can only see an arbitrarily fixed number of new clients during any one year. If the solicitor runs out of matter starts, any subsequent clients seeking legal help must be turned away. Again this comes about not as a result of any logical decision as to which cases should or should not be funded, but as a result of the time of year at which the client happens to seek assistance.

 

Bureaucracy and micro-management

 

  1. At the heart of the CLS is an elaborate and byzantine system of bureaucracy, operated by the Legal Services Commission, to award, audit and quality control legal aid contracts and other partnership projects. The LSC does not come cheap: its administrative costs are around £70m, double that of the Legal Aid Board – its predecessor agency.

 

  1. The system wastes significant resources on time-consuming contract compliance and performance management processes. Contracts contain an unnecessary level of detailed reporting and administrative requirements, to the extent that some providers find that the actual costs of running a legal aid contract can turn out to be more than they’re being paid by LSC. At worst the LSC can impose financial penalties during the financial year, if LSC auditors are unhappy about the management of contracts on the basis of a small sample of files.

 

  1. The contracts contain a number of unfairnesses and inflexibilities and use proxies for quality to measure performance; the contracts run to 250 pages of detailed rules on the type and units of work that can be claimed. If providers do not work to the LSC’s strict rules, contract payments can be downgraded within the financial year to reflect audit results. In some cases, the LSC attempts to claw back money.  This all       creates huge uncertainty for providers and further undermines their capacity to plan their services and employment arrangements.

 

  1. Above all the auditing system is profoundly wasteful. It is manifestly absurd to have a thousand auditors auditing five thousand contracts. Indeed reports from both the National Audit Office and the Public Accounts Committee have questioned whether the introduction of contracting and its accompanying compliance and enforcement regime have provided value for money.[7] Moreover, civil legal help and advice only account for 12% of the overall legal aid budget, yet it is these files that are the most heavily audited. These resources could be better spent on supporting providers through ‘quality development and support’ services rather rigid rule-based contract compliance audits. The LSC has now undertaken to lighten the load for providers achieving ‘’preferred supplier status’’, but the majority are intermediary and average performing suppliers, helping many thousands of clients. These potentially reach the level of the best with some extra support. However, the policy of only supporting ‘preferred suppliers’ will drive many more firms and agencies out of the market.

 

  1. Despite the introduction of a rigorous audit regime, there nevertheless continues to be a problem with ‘rogue firms’ operating in certain legal practice fields, such as immigration, which raises questions over how effective the audit process really is. The problem is that the LSC ‘uses a hammer to crack a nut’, which penalises good, average and poor providers equally. It would be preferable to weed out the rogue suppliers at a much earlier stage, through operating a blacklist.

 

Inadequate Funding

 

  1. There are inadequate resources overall for civil legal aid.  Although spending on legal aid has risen from £1.5 billion in 1997 to £2 billion this year, this does not reflect responsiveness to demand and is largely accounted for by the growth of criminal legal aid. In 2001 the civil legal aid budget took up 43% of an overall legal aid budget of £1.716 billion, being £476 million for certificated work and £259 million for help and advice.  That made a total of £750 million odd for civil legal aid, in addition to which there was £400 million odd recovered under the statutory charge.  Legal aid currently provides 13% of solicitors’ overall income.  That figure used to be 30% in early 1990s, though the larger part of that amount was criminal legal aid.

 

  1. The spend breaks down into different fields for advice and representation.  Family work tops both but thereafter the money spent on advice and legal help is the greatest for immigration, then welfare, debt, housing and employment.  The money spent on representation, after family work, goes on clinical negligence, immigration, actions against the police and employment, and the small amount of personal injury work that remains within scope.

 

  1. Since the advent of the CLS, the civil budget has been capped at £820 million – it cannot go over this figure, whilst the criminal legal aid bill has increased by 22 % over the last year alone. Within the civil budget, the expenditure on legal aid for asylum seekers has increased from £81.3m in 2000-2001 to £129.7m in 2001-2002 and £174.2m in 2002-2003, thus squeezing the remainder of the civil legal aid budget.

 

Remuneration

 

  1. All contract values have been frozen at 2001-2002 levels, with no allowance for the RPI, cost of living increases, rises in national insurance contributions or upgrading of IT and other office systems. In real terms this means that providers are having to subsidise contracted work and deliver more work for less every year.  This is having a devastating effects on professional morale in the legal aid sector. Research suggests that 44% of legal aid firms would be unwilling to take on more work at current remuneration rates whilst 24% of firms surveyed stated that they would be willing to take on more legal aid work, but would need to hire more staff and/or expand their premises to be able to do so.[8]

 

  1. The increasingly unviable pay rates for solicitors are at the root of the long-term rundown in the legal aid system.  To that must be added its stultifying bureaucracy and the relentless increase in the volume and complexity of statute law, which affect the costs per case. The assumption by this Government and its predecessor that cost savings can always be squeezed out of any system by economies of scale may work in the retail sector but has little application to legal services.   This is the because legal services are, intrinsically, highly personal and, where the legal aid scheme is concerned, are also concentrated on the most disadvantaged and needy citizens. They, in turn, can be a demanding clientele in terms of their ability both to impart clear instructions and to understand and act on advice. 

 

  1. The truth is that solicitors doing legal aid work are, far from riding a gravy train, undertaking some of the most difficult and yet the worst remunerated work confronting the profession.  Typically legal aid rates (most of which have not been uprated in line with inflation for years) are half or less than the rates for the same work done for private clients. To make matters worse, the bureaucracy imposed by the Legal Services Commission is choking, ineffectual and demoralising.  As the Legal Aid Practitioners Group makes clear, it often involves a paper-chase charade in which real quality of outcome is largely overlooked.  Perhaps that is unsurprising given that only a tiny number of Commission assessors have hands-on experience of the type of work they are auditing.  Furthermore solicitors are not remunerated for the considerable time spent dealing with the bureaucracy involved in managing the work they do.

 

  1. It is against this backdrop that many legal aid solicitors, whilst still possessed of a strong sense of public service, are ‘getting out’, with many others cutting back on the volume of cases they will undertake and/or cherry-picking those that they do.  Often it is the most capable practitioners who are giving up, confident that they can replace their legal aid caseload with private work with less trouble and more reward. Thus, as this report and other reports detail, there are now growing deserts of legal aid provision all over the country and, no less important, a clear but immeasurable decline in the quality and experience of those offering it.  This is particularly obvious in the immigration and asylum field, because of a combination of the above factors reinforced by a concentration of that work in urban areas and amongst certain communities. None of these issues can be addressed without a clear and transparent system of remuneration tied to professional competence and public service ethics.

 

Reduced scope of legal aid:

 

  1. Finally, the Access to Justice Act reduced the scope of legal aid in order to target more resources on social welfare law.  Personal injury cases were excluded from legal aid altogether and the rules excluding tribunal cases from legal aid were made harsher. The withdrawal of legal aid from personal injury in particular in favour of promoting conditional fee agreements has led to the growth of an unregulated claims handling industry (such as Claims Direct (now insolvent) and the Accident Group) and ethical concerns about their practices. 

 

  1. The withdrawal of public funding from claimants in personal injury cases has led to a substantial growth in the use of conditional fee agreements (“no win no fee”).  This was intended by the Government in passing the Access to Justice Act. The benefit of the availability of conditional fee agreements (“CFAs”) is that access to the courts is available to claimants with strong cases, particularly simple ones, even if they would not have qualified financially for legal aid. However, there are serious ethical and consumer concerns about the effect of CFAs on the provision of legal services (see paras. 66-74 below).

 

Uneven Planning and Partnerships

 

  1. There are two mechanisms for tackling local service gaps in the CLS: needs assessments are carried out by the Regional LSC Offices and local partnerships (CLSPs) have been established to help formulate contracting strategies and develop local services. CLSPs are charged with a number of challenging tasks:  first, assessing local priority needs for legal advice and guidance and the production of a Strategic Plan;  secondly, establishing referral systems;  thirdly, taking action within local communities to increase access to justice for all, especially those groups or individuals experiencing social deprivation. They are also expected to establish linkages with Government programmes and local initiatives. Without support it is impossible for partnerships to fulfil this role, and research shows that in many parts of the country these partnerships are moribund – this is not surprising as they have very few resources to support their challenging development brief.  

 

  1. CLSPs were developed under the Access to Justice Act across most of the country. In theory, they bring together local solicitors, not for profit advisers and funders from the LSC and the local authority to discuss and plan local provision of advice services. In practice CLSPs have not been a success. The Department of Constitutional Affairs has recently published its three-year review of the Community Legal Service. The problems it identified with CLSPs included the following (page 62):

(i)                 The role of CLSPs is unclear;

(ii)               The influence of CLSPs and their strategic plans for funding and other decisions is unclear;

(iii)             Initial enthusiasm for the new CLSPs has diminished as their initial role has been fulfilled and their future role is unclear;

(iv)              Membership of CLSPs is variable and limited, particularly among private sector providers;

(v)                There is relatively little emphasis on preventative policy work within the CLS;

(vi)              There are relatively few ‘levers’ for encouraging active participation in CLSPs;

(vii)            There is some (largely anecdotal) evidence to suggest that local authorities are seeking ways to reduce their input into CLS services.

 

  1. CLSPs have been hampered in their development by the fact that members are not entitled to any compensation for the time spent on CLSP work, or even out of pocket expenses. The involvement of solicitors in private practice has been patchy. Legal professionals make up 25% of the membership of CLSPs, while those from the not for profit sector make up 33% of the membership.[9] Yet 93% of the CLS budget of £812 million goes to solicitors, and only 7% to nfp agencies.[10] Other findings of the Review Team make for more discouraging reading. 31% of respondents to the Review Team’s survey considered their needs analysis to be “not very accurate” or “not accurate”; while many of the referral systems have already fallen into disuse because they were unduly complex.[11]

 

  1. The Review Team indicated that it seriously considered recommending the abolition of CLSPs. However, it drew back from this step “because it would leave the CLS without a local strategic presence and would fail to capitalise on the useful work already undertaken by partnerships”. Good work the Review team identified included the following:

·        The development of outreach services where providers are awarded contracts which authorise them to provide outreach sessions to cover areas where there is no current contractor. These are understood to be particularly useful in rural and remote areas where there is not enough demand to sustain a full time contract.

·        Innovative approaches such as telephone helplines dealing with specific areas of advice provide mechanisms to improve coverage and access. Such initiatives have been developed not only to help address gaps in provision of legal services, but also to help people in rural areas and people with disabilities to obtain access to justice.

·        Regional LSC contracts given to providers to provide specialist support services offering telephone advice, mentoring and support to organisations working within the CLS to enable them to undertake cases which would otherwise be beyond their ability; and

·        The Partnership Initiative Budget (PIB), which has enabled CLSPs to access funds to develop local initiatives to address problems associated with gaps in provision.

 

  1. On the wider issue of strategic planning at regional level, the LSC allocates contracts on the basis of contracting strategies, which prioritise areas with high indicia of social exclusion. However, these priorities are assessed borough by borough and that makes it difficult for more affluent boroughs, which nonetheless contain significant pockets of deprivation and legal need, to access sufficient provision in their deprived areas.

 

Verdict on the Access to Justice Act regime

 

  1. The mechanisms described above were intended to control cost and ensure value for money from a limited budget for civil legal aid.  However, as discussed above, within the overall legal aid budget, spending on criminal and asylum cases, where legal aid is mandatory, has squeezed the remainder of the civil legal aid budget. The increases in expenditure in criminal and asylum cases, at the expense of other important areas of civil law such as housing and family, have been explained by the Government in terms of their having to meet obligations under the Human Rights Act.   This is not an adequate explanation, because the HRA applies equally across a wide range of civil cases. Furthermore, considerable legal expenditure on legal aid in asylum cases has been attributable to the failure of Home Office procedures, increased refugee flows from conflict zones and the effect of dispersal policy.

 

  1. The result, however, of capping the civil budget is that there is manifestly an insufficient level of service provision in important areas of social welfare law such as housing and employment. Legal aid clients often have to travel significant distances and wait a number of weeks to access the appropriate specialist services; for the client who needs an emergency injunction against his or her violent partner, a defence in housing possession proceedings, or a challenge to a bailiff’s warrant, this is far from helpful.

 

  1. The combined effect of heavy-handed bureaucratic control from the centre and insufficient resources for capacity building at local level is that thousands of people do not get the help that they need and the Community Legal Service remains at best a “fig leaf’’ or virtual service. In many parts of the country, especially rural communities, solicitors are no longer undertaking legally aided work on housing, domestic violence and community care issues, employment or asylum and immigration. Clients eligible for legal aid rarely have the resources to travel to obtain legal advice. There is insufficient capacity in the advice sector to pick up these cases at specialist and court practice level. For those most in need the services simply aren’t there; this is not simply a problem in isolated or ’ghost town’ communities - places like Maidenhead, Leatherhead, Romsey, Rugby and Newcastle-under-Lyme also have no solicitors doing publicly funded work at all.

The Liberal Democrat Approach 

 

Justice First

 

  1. The starting principles for Liberal Democrats are that the civil justice system should serve everyone in society equally and that no citizen should be without access to legal advice in respect of his or her individual rights because he or she cannot afford to pay for it.  For those principles to be reflected in reality it is clear that:

·        there should be no discretionary rationing of legal assistance,

·        remuneration for those undertaking publicly funded work should be set at a level that ensures quality of service,

·        there should be an easy-to-use and widely accessible publicly funded legal advice scheme and

·        there should be a contributory legal representation scheme which ensures that there is universal access to the courts.

 

Department of Justice

 

  1. The Liberal Democrats are committed to creating a Department of Justice as the first step to improving the position of the justice system in the public sector.  Liberal Democrats would regard the resourcing and organisation of publicly funded legal services as a key responsibility of the new Department.    

 

Resources

 

  1. In today’s complex society a wholly demand-led legal aid service would be difficult to achieve; however, as a minimum, the system must be responsive to demand, to local conditions and variations.  There must be some minimal guaranteed level of service accessible locally.  If civil justice is not available throughout the country citizens are not equal before the law. The response to the rising cost of legal aid should be to recognise that expenditure on the civil justice system is desirable and necessary in itself and that the benefits of the availability of legal assistance include substantial savings in other areas of government spending. These savings should be taken into account when assessing the cost of legal aid and comparing the allocation of resources to the DCA (or a Department of Justice as we advocate) with the allocations to other major spending departments.   It is simply not acceptable to Liberal Democrats to scale back on legal advice and assistance in important areas of social welfare such as housing, family, employment and debt.

 

  1. A comparative perspective is needed.   Currently, legal aid spending is equivalent to 5% of the expenditure of the NHS.  Within the framework of Government Department budgets, legal aid expenditure of 2 billion is almost insignificant.   Government locally and nationally spends billions on publicly funded, subsidised, partnered or regulated services, and yet a great deal of political commentary is devoted to the waste, travesty and unaffordability of a growing legal aid budget. It is incumbent upon Liberal Democrats to tackle these myths and to meet the challenge of properly funding legal aid, which we regard as a vital public service.

 

Ring Fencing

 

  1. The civil legal aid budget needs to be based more directly upon and to be subject to a separate Treasury submission during Comprehensive Spending Reviews. There are a number of ways in which this recommendation could be achieved, either directly (by ring-fencing the civil legal aid budget) or indirectly (eg by ring-fencing the criminal legal aid budget). A first step would be to fix the budget for elements of civil law where increases in legal and advice costs associated with them are driven by factors outside of the CLS (eg family law and mental health). This is already being undertaken to protect the civil legal aid budget from the rising of expenditure on immigration and asylum work.

 

Rationing

 

  1. Just as it would not be acceptable to limit by arbitrary capping the number of income support claimants that will be given help in any one year, it is no more reasonable to limit the number of those provided with essential legal help in this way. There should be honest prioritisation of resources. It is of course accepted that it is not practical or financially possible to meet all need for legal aid services.  But it is the responsibility of Government to maintain control of the budget, not by imposing a cost-led limit on numbers of clients, but by carefully adjusting the criteria for scope and eligibility.  Once those criteria have been set, every client who meets those criteria and seeks help should get it.

 

Commissioning Services – SLAs

 

  1. We agree with the broad aims of the CLS that publicly funded legal services must be multi-agency in character and should be used to tackle the problems of social exclusion. However, in practice providers are so restricted in the work they are able to carry out under their contracts that multi-agency working, holistic services and referrals are inhibited rather than encouraged. Liberal Democrats therefore propose to introduce a different model of legal aid practice focused on achieving diverse points of access and ensuring a public service of high quality.  

 

  1. The backbone of any publicly funded legal service should continue to be solicitors’ firms playing to their local market strengths and legal expertise, but solicitors’ work should be supported by a diverse network of advice agencies and community organisations. Continued support from the legal professions for a thriving publicly funded sector is essential to ensuring access to justice.  However, there will be a continued decline in the accessibility of legal expertise unless the problems of under-resourcing and bureaucracy which we have identified are fully addressed. 

 

  1. Liberal Democrats would move from the current system of narrowly focused, case-rationed and heavily regulated contracts to a system of Service level agreements. Service level agreements would specify certain criteria for the services to be delivered, rather than numbers of cases.  The terms might include the number of hours to be undertaken, the number of sessions at a Court or in outreach services at a particular location, or the number of advisors available to provide a particular service; however, there should not be any standard model for SLAs – they should be tailored to maximise the skills and capacity of the service provider.  Payment should be for delivery of the agreed level of service.

 

  1. As far as possible, the SLAs will allow the solicitor to provide the service the client needs in accordance with his/her own professional judgement. Service level agreements could also be used as a vehicle for encouraging innovation and partnership working between providers. For example, where appropriate an SLA could form the basis for commissioning a consortium of local providers to provide a ‘one stop shop’ for the provision of all early prevention, advice and publicly funded legal provision.

 

  1. We regard it as essential to the restoration and maintenance of the confidence of the profession in the system of allocating agreements that practising solicitors, with current experience of publicly-funded work, be involved in the process.  We would establish a system where such solicitors would be seconded to work with the LSC on a part-time basis for periods or two or three years to assist officials in assessing bids and awarding SLAs.

 

Bureaucracy

 

  1. There must of course be accountability for the expenditure of public money, not only in the selection of the firms to provide the service, but also in ensuring that they have properly earned the sums paid to them. This should be primarily by way of peer review, undertaken at arms’ length from the Legal Services Commission, which would retain overall management of the system. Where providers have demonstrated quality, the auditing should be as light as is consistent with proper accountability, in order to ensure that the cost burden of providing the service is as low as possible.

 

Remuneration

 

  1. In order to retain and build skills in publicly funded advice work the issue of remuneration needs to be addressed. Specialists and legal professionals must be entitled to a fair rate of remuneration for their services.  However, legal aid rates – far from being a gravy train – are low in comparison with remuneration levels in other parts of the public sector.  Recruitment into legal aid work is now becoming a significant problem.  This is not helped by the level of debt that is commonly incurred in securing legal qualifications.  For solicitors to remain the backbone of the legal aid service, remuneration rates should be sufficiently attractive both to recruit and to retain competent legal professionals able to provide timely and effective advice and representation services to their clients. We propose to address this problem by referring legal aid rates to an independent Review Board, tasked to ensure that legal aid rates are set at a level which will enable practitioners to earn sums commensurate with the rewards of other comparable professionals within the public sector.

 

Advice Centres

 

  1. The legal advice sector as a whole needs to increase its capacity to deliver high quality first-tier advice in the community, for which advice services are often the first port of call – with appropriate specialists and professionals easily available through advice networks. In many cases legal action is required urgently to be of any use, so providers need to work effectively in legal action networks.   Solicitors and barristers specialising in particular subjects should form part of these networks, whether in private practice or attached to advice centres, but taking referrals and providing “second tier” services across the network. It must always be the choice of the consumer whether to contact an adviser, specialist or legal practitioner in the first instance – multi-agency advice networks would thus provide multiple points of access to the civil justice system.

 

  1. We would encourage the development of a countrywide system of efficient well funded Call Centres and Community Justice Centres geared to offering information on a wide range of topics and to giving directions as to how and where to access further advice. Some of the functions of the Community Justice Centres we envisage are already well carried out by the 2,800 CABx across the country.  But some areas, especially rural ones, are 'advice deserts', where citizens have no or minimal access to advice.  Upon the establishment of the proposed Equalities and Human Rights Commission it might be possible to establish combined advice centres with the Commission.

 

  1. The value of such centres would be that they would be able to offer more than a traditional appointment with a lawyer.  They could be centres of multi-provision with other services, including NHS and other local authority services. However, Community Justice Centres must above all be properly resourced.  They should offer a range of advice and legal services.  Different disciplines could come together to work in them on a sessional basis.  Staff should include mediators, conciliators, specialist advisors, the public defender service, rehabilitation services, lawyers, probation officers and local authority officers. Such centres could provide an attractive setting for the provision of legal services.  We would not rule out providing part-time courts for small claims resolution, sitting in Community Justice Centres.

 

  1. We do not propose that there should be any “one model fits all” solution to the development of such centres. However, we believe that our proposals for a flexible funding system based on service level agreements and the encouragement of consortia would provide a framework for their development. All local authorities should however be required to formulate and publish advice strategies.   

 

Call Centres

 

  1. We recommend that a call centre system be set up and run by the Legal Services Commission by extending the current National Telephone Service to all areas of legal and advice expertise.  The LSC might in future work in close co-operation with the new Equalities and Human Rights Commission over the development of telephone and other non-traditional ways of providing and disseminating advice and information. 

 

Outreach Services

 

  1. Outreach services are often the most appropriate solution for areas of dispersed population and poor proximity to service. There are many examples of good practice and innovative ways of delivering outreach surgeries; for example in Devon a project is underway for a ‘Law Bus’ based on the model of the mobile library service. Outreach need not stop at the point of advice and information giving, but could extend to other parts of the justice system.   Again, mobile courts would be a possibility.

 

Public Education

 

  1. Access to justice could also be improved with a better information and public education strategy. Information needs to be provided in a variety of ways.  The young and computer literate will probably choose the internet as a first port of call.  But the most vulnerable people in the community often lack both IT training and access to computers.  For them the telephone is a vital conduit to information. 

 

  1. The statutory inclusion of Citizenship classes in the curriculum of schools at secondary level is welcomed by the Liberal Democrat Party.  It should result in future generations of young adults having a clearer understanding of their rights and responsibilities.  But greater awareness brings with it higher expectations of the observance of these rights and of quick and easy access to information about them.    If expectations are left unfulfilled, if access to information and advice is not available, citizens of all ages are left feeling cheated, disillusioned and disenfranchised. 

 

Partnerships

 

  1. Liberal Democrats have strong reservations about the existing system of Partnerships, but acknowledge that some of them are performing useful work. An attempt should therefore be made to bring all of them up to the standard of the best. If, however, this does not enable the majority of CLSPs to perform a worthwhile function, reconsideration should be given to abolition.

 

  1. It is clear from the CLS Review that the best-functioning partnerships are generally those to which the relevant local authorities have shown a substantive commitment. We therefore accept the recommendations of the Review that CLSPs should be made coterminous with upper tier and unitary authorities, and that a statutory duty should be placed on those local authorities to support the CLSPs. The authorities should be required to undertake a triennial audit of supply and demand (which LSC regional offices would use for making commissioning decisions), and a triennial consultation exercise. They should then develop a three-year strategy for legal and advice services in their area. The legislation should include a requirement for the local authority to consider the impact upon the Community Legal Service in all its decisions. The work of the CLSPs should, as recommended by the review, be refocused on the following areas:

(i)                 Strategic, preventative work, with the CLSPs facilitating the development of preventative strategies with organisations whose policies contribute to the causes of problems;

(ii)               The development of a more joined-up system through the development and promotion of ‘care pathways’ through the CLS;

(iii)             Networking and relationship building, to encourage referral activities to be based on a better understanding of providers and the services they provide; and

(iv)              Contributing to, but not leading, supply and demand mapping (including analysis of need), undertaken at regional level.

 

  1. Local authorities should play a greater role in supporting partnerships; the partnerships themselves need more autonomy and resources to add value to the legal aid system;  more decisions about where and how services should be commissioned could be devolved to partnerships.  This approach would be entirely consistent with the Liberal Democrats long-standing commitment to decentralised decision-making.

 

Scope of Legal Aid

 

  1. A number of challenging questions remain about the scope of legal aid funding. Under current eligibility rules, legal aid is only available for the very poorest. Whilst there is a generous gross incomes test for eligibility of £2288 per month, anyone with a monthly net income of more than £621 per month, after housing costs and allowances for dependants, or savings of more than £3,000, will not usually be eligible for civil legal aid under the LSC funding rules. Policy on eligibility at national level must take into account the wide variations of income, differences in living costs and problem clusters in different parts of the country.

 

  1. We would propose modifying the funding rules by reducing the gross income test and increasing the net income test, whilst at the same time reforming the system of contributions so that those who can afford to make contributions towards their legal costs are required to do so, especially where cases are successful and the client is deriving a financial benefit. However, people should not be required to release equity in their homes to access legal help.  We are also concerned that differences in housing costs, incomes and living costs can lead to significant regional variations in legal aid access under a single funding code.[12] A solution might be a locally varied rate.

 

  1. In addition, all cases have to pass through a rigid set of cost benefit, chances of success, grounds of law and public benefit criteria in order to merit funding. This is fine in principle and a sound basis for public funding policy – it should never be the purpose of public funding to fund trivial, frivolous or unmeritorious cases. However, claims of low monetary value often fail the cost benefit test, even though the issues are of great importance for the client. The merits test needs to be modified in order to take account of the importance of the issues to the client.  The merits test should require that decisions on public funding are taken on a comparable basis to decisions that might be taken by a privately paying client, even though their choices, circumstances and options may be substantially different.

 

Tribunals and ADR

 

  1. It is essential for the protection of civil rights that publicly funded legal representation should be available before tribunals as well as the courts.  Before taking Office as Lord Chancellor, Lord Irvine of Lairg described the exclusion of tribunal representation from legal aid funding as ‘’a gap which cannot be rationally justified in the provision of legal aid….there is no greater unfairness than the leally unrepresented applicant against the legally represented employer in industrial tribunal cases ….(it is) ..irrational to exclude tribunal cases from any call on the legal aid budget.’’[13] However, once in office that is precisely what Lord Irvine did.

 

  1. Tribunals provide a specialist adjudicative forum for certain kinds of dispute. It is arbitrary and unfair to refuse publicly funded legal representation in cases that fulfil the public funding merits criteria, merely because the forum is a tribunal rather than a court. Both have the jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes on their legal merits. The scope of public funding should be extended to tribunals; arguably this is required in many types of cases (e.g. discrimination cases) by the Human Rights Act.

 

  1. Resolving issues through tribunal processes prevents legal problems from escalating further. The same applies to other ADR schemes (such as the Ombudsman schemes). However, there is currently no incentive for legal aid professionals to use ADR.  Furthermore, lawyers are limited in the amount of contract time they can claim for dealing with correspondence on behalf of clients, which may be essential to negotiate the resolution of a dispute and can prevent litigation.  Funding for tribunals and ADR must be integrated into the funding arrangements established in service level agreements. This could be introduced on an incremental basis, for example by providing in the first instance for publicly funded representation in employment tribunals.  

 

Personal Injury and Conditional Fee Agreements

 

  1. There remains a strong public interest argument for the availability of legal aid funding in personal injury cases. However, there is a quite legitimate debate on alternative funding models for some types of compensation claims, in which Liberal Democrats should engage.  Taxing damages (the contingency principle), insurance and  compulsory mediation schemes all bear consideration.  We are clear, however, that we do not favour the continuation of the current unchecked conditional fee agreement (CFA) system in which unregulated and often unethical claims companies act as gatekeepers to the legal process: this gives minimal consumer protection. 

 

  1. The development of CFA funded litigation has been assisted by the provisions of the Access to Justice Act enabling recovery from defendants of (1) the uplift payable to solicitors and counsel in successful cases (currently limited to 100% of fees or 25% of the damages award, whichever is higher) and (2) insurance premiums paid by claimants to insurers to buy off the risk of adverse costs orders in case of failure (“after the event insurance”).

 

  1. However, the system has a number of serious inherent problems:

 

(i)                 There is a serious risk of conflicts of interest between solicitors and counsel on the one hand and their clients on the other; a settlement offer that ought in the client’s best interest to be rejected as too low may prove attractive to his or her lawyers as a way of ensuring that payment is received.

 

(ii)               There is a serious risk that lawyers’ ethical approach to litigation may be compromised by their being financially interested in the outcome; the temptation not to disclose documents and/or authorities adverse to a client’s case is much stronger if the result is likely to be that all work done on the case will go unremunerated; similarly, there may be a much greater risk of coaching witnesses.

 

(iii)             It is likely that lawyers’ objectivity is compromised by their having a financial interest in the outcome of their cases.

 

(iv)              CFAs also encourage the cherry-picking of high value cases with high chances of success and can result in lawyers refusing to take on good small claims which may be of enormous financial and personal significance to the client.

 

(v)                There is a philosophical objection to defendants’ being obliged effectively to fund the cases which their opponents’ lawyers lose by paying double the real costs of cases brought against them.  There is a similar objection to defendants being obliged to fund insurance policies to protect claimants who bring cases that fail.

 

(vi)              The availability of CFAs and the possibility of recovery of uplifts and after the event premiums has led to the proliferation of businesses – and advertising campaigns - offering to pursue claims for nothing for clients who have had accidents “through someone else’s fault”.  This has contributed greatly to the perception, on this point somewhat justified, that Britain is increasingly affected by a “compensation culture”.

 

  1. As against (v) above, it may be seen as fairer that in general defendants should risk paying more in cases won by claimants than that they should be unable to recover their costs against assisted claimants in cases won by defendants.  This is the situation still facing litigants who succeed against assisted parties with limited means.  However, where a party who has lost a case is an individual who satisfies the court that he or she will suffer hardship, the court should have discretion to refuse to order that party to pay part or all of the uplift element of the winner’s costs. 

 

  1. The most problematic part though of the CFA regime has been the intermediaries market. Claims management has become a growth industry with over six hundred providers ranging from large claims handling operations to small businesses, marketing CFA schemes. Both Claims Direct and The Accident Group took advantage of the recoverability of after-the-event insurance to charge absurdly high premiums in the hope that the liability insurers would be forced to pay. In particular doorstep selling is an area in which unfair trading practices thrive and consumers’ rights are inadequate. 

 

  1. In addition to the concern that people are being pressured or misled into signing up to something they do not understand, it is also apparent that in many cases the sales staff approaching consumers are not qualified to give advice as to whether the agreement is the best option for them, let alone as to their chances of a successful outcome. Typically the consumers in this market are on low incomes and vulnerable, as they have suffered some level of personal physical injury for which compensation could be available if elements of fault liability and causation can be established. Interestingly though, the quick profits gained from mass claims farming have not proved to be sustainable, as the larger claims management companies have in fact gone insolvent amidst allegations of fraud.

 

  1. There are wider issues also concerning the level of costs passed onto the consumer.  Lack of proper explanation of the schemes also means lack of explanation of the possible risks.  Many schemes are marketed on the basis that they are ‘no win, no fee’.  However, uncertainty over whether the costs of loan agreements taken out to fund after-the-event insurance premiums can be recovered from the other side has led to problems for consumers.  Some have ended up funding repayment of such loans from their compensation awards, in some cases leaving them with nothing or even with a loss. 

 

  1. Nevertheless, on balance we are of the view that in principle CFAs can offer access to justice to many litigants who do not meet the criteria for public funding and that this benefit outweighs the disadvantages inherent in a conditional fee system.  We are also of the view that to deny citizens the right to contract on a “no win no fee” basis would be an unwarranted interference with their freedom to contract as they please, which would require substantial justification.  We are not persuaded that the problems set out above constitute such justification, given the countervailing benefit of wider access to justice afforded by the availability of CFAs. 

 

  1. However, we do insist that there should be much more careful supervision of CFAs by the professions and by the regulatory authorities.  A scheme of statutory regulation, professional panels and a code of practice is urgently needed for companies that provide or broker legal services under CFA arrangements.  This should be directed at ensuring that the availability of CFA-funded litigation does not lead to a general lowering of ethical standards and a proliferation of unmeritorious cases, often pursued in the hope of recovering “nuisance value” payments from insurers unwilling to meet the cost of resisting large numbers of small claims.

 

  1. Furthermore specific measures will be needed to tackle the practices of rogue claims management firms.   In particular, there should be an obligation upon all claims management organisations to ensure complete transparency, both when agreements are made as to their terms and when claims are settled as to the net benefit to the client, after deduction of all costs and expenses.

 

  1. We would also make it clear that we would maintain the present limits on the level of success fees, which strike a reasonable balance between the interests of lawyers and parties.  We would also oppose any move towards lawyers being permitted to work for contingency fees, calculated as a percentage of damages awarded, unrelated to the work carried out in securing them.  A contingency fee system involves successful claimants in paying over to their lawyers’ substantial proportions of the damages awarded to them, often on the basis of need.  Such a system is also irreconcilable with the British arrangement that generally a successful claimant recovers costs against the defendant, whose retention we would support.

 

A Contingency Legal Aid Fund

 

  1. The Liberal Democrat Lawyers Association have in the past recommended the establishment of a contingency legal aid fund (“CLAF”), which would be funded by the retention of a small proportion of the damages awarded to assisted litigants in successful cases to meet the unrecovered costs of assisted litigants in unsuccessful or less successful cases. However, in view of our conclusion that we should not withdraw the right to pursue litigation funded by conditional fees, we do not feel able any longer to press for the establishment of a contingency legal aid fund.  Such a fund can only succeed if large numbers of cases with a substantial prospect of success are likely to be funded by it.  This is necessary in order that a small proportion of the damages recovered in successful cases will be sufficient to fund those cases for which the fund ends up paying, because they do not succeed.  With a CFA system is in place, it is inevitable that many of the cases with a very high prospect of success are funded by CFAs.  That would mean that a CLAF would be left to fund only the more difficult cases, so that the proportion of damages secured in successful cases needed to cover the costs of unsuccessful cases would be unacceptably high.

 

  1. In addition, the start-up costs of establishing a CLAF would be high, because all cases accepted by the fund would require expenditure before any money could be recouped from the damages awarded in those cases that were ultimately successful.  This would make the establishment of a CLAF a difficult option to pursue in the face of the competition from CFAs and the consequences outlined above.

 

Conclusion

 

  1. It is vital that the civil justice system is fit to deal with the complex legal problems of twenty first century Britain. However, there are no quick fixes to the challenges facing the civil justice system today – within the modern state structure, civil justice has always been treated as the ‘’poor relation’’of other public services such as health and education. Yet access to the civil justice system can properly be called the fourth right of citizenship. Liberal Democrats must be prepared to commit resources both locally and nationally to making this right a reality.

 

  1. Abolishing crude case rationing and the ‘’one size fits all’’ contracting system, and allowing for more flexible commissioning arrangements, would be important first steps to achieving a better range of services and increasing capacity.

 

  1. The issue of appropriate remuneration also needs to be urgently addressed in the context of the services that legal practitioners provide to their clients and communities. An independent review would be able to address all the issues concerning pay scales and renumeration, including public sector equivalence and competitive pressures.  

 

  1. To support a system that is better funded and more responsive to demand, a strategic approach to funding should be developed across Government, involving local government also. Liberal Democrats are challenging Government at both local and national level to address shortcomings in the public funding policy under the Community Legal Service, which can leave the most vulnerable people in society without hope of achieving change, independence or improved quality of life.

 

  1. The proposals in this paper for increasing the capacity of publicly funded legal services to meet demand, improving the role of the civil justice and courts system and devolving greater responsibility from central government agencies to the front line legal services, will make a significant impact on the quality of justice and the culture of rights in our society. 

 


 

Appendix – Costing LDLA's proposal on civil justice

 

  1. A ‘whole system’ model of advice and legal services is required, to enable government and the public to understand the net social, health and productivity gains of good quality advice and legal help, its added value in a consumer economy, and its essential contribution to the functioning of civil society.  Costings must reflect the whole systems model by looking at the savings ’downstream’ (resolution of justiciable disputes, social and business gains) of investing in civil justice ‘upstream,’ (investment in infrastructure of advice and legal services and improving Court based services.)

 

  1. The ‘whole systems‘ model is adapted from the work of Sir Derek Wanless. The Wanless Report, commissioned by the Treasury, undertook a detailed review of long-term requirements in NHS funding: the number of people to be trained, the skills they will require, the types of buildings likely to be needed and the information and communication technologies upon which the efficient operation of the system will depend.[14] The whole system, including prevention, diagnosis and treatment, rehabilitation and long-term care is seen from the perspective of the individual patient, with appropriate structures recommended to produce sensible incentives and to direct resources efficiently. The review concluded that social care is inextricably linked to health care and must be considered together as part of the same system. The Review identified and drew out the key relationships between the two and set out illustrative projections of resource requirements for social care for adults (especially older people) based on the present position adjusted for changes in the population and in the level of ill health.

 

  1. A direct analogy can be made with the legal aid system: early prevention and ADR can save legal costs, just as social care can save health costs. It is only through this type of comprehensive model that we can establish an overall picture of the costs of civil justice. The LSC’s survey of legal needs acts as a good starting point for mapping legal needs experience, and matching funding and structures to the appropriate indices of demand within the context of eligibility criteria. The ‘advice impact’ of government policy also need to be factored in. A separate budgetary process is required for infrastructure costs, including upgrading IT and facilities in courts and legal advice centres. Efficiency gains also need to be factored in.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

A whole systems costings model - Example

 

Costs

Savings

 

 

Infrastructure costs

-    Courts

-    Advice Centres

-    Call Centres

-           

Administrative savings

Cost of new commissioning arrangements

Efficiency Savings

Development and support costs

- Outreach services

Dispute Resolution Savings

-    Economic and productivity gains

-    Health Gains

-    Public Administration gains

Cost of bringing tribunals into scope

Savings from increased statutory contributions

Remuneration and pay board

Local Authority Contribution

Advice and Legislative Impacts

 

Public Legal Education

Prevention savings

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

(Figures to be completed as part of costings process)

 

 



[1] Pleasance et al: Causes of Action – Civil Law and Social Exclusion LSRC 2004;

[2] Woolf Access to Justice LCD 1996

[3] Auld Review of the Criminal Courts 2001

[4] Independent Review of the Community Legal Service, DCA 2004

[5] For an abridged History of Legal aid expenditure see Legal aid HoC Research Paper 99/33

http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/rp99/rp99-033.pdf

[6] Geography of Advice: An Overview of the Challenges Facing the Community Legal Service, Citizens Advice, February 2004

[7] National Audit Office Report (HC 89 2002-2003): Community Legal Service: the introduction of contracting

[8] A market analysis of legal aided services provided by solicitors, Frontier Economics December 2003

[9] Independent Review of the Community Legal Service, DCA 2004, page 38

[10] LSC Annual Report, 2003,

[11] Independent Review of the Community Legal Service, DCA 2004, page 42

[12] There is an equity disregard of £100,000

[13] Law Reform for All, 1996

[14] Wanless: Securing Our Future Health: Taking a Long-Term View, HMT 2003